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Recent interest in planning and zoning makes the publication of the following
article highly appropriate. The author is a Professor of Law in Indiana Univer-
sity, and is a recognized authority in the fields of land utilization and of legislation.
Sanctions Against Governmental Violations of
Planning and Zoning Ordinances
by Frank E. Horack, Jr.
Apparently it is a characteristic of
sovereignty, whether it be regal or
democratic, to be unwilling to live
by its own law. Typically, the execu-
tive, legislative and judicial branches
of government support the sov-
ereign's claim of immunity. Not in-
frequently the legislature expressly
exempts the sovereign from statu-
tory regulation. And the judiciary, in
cases of ambiguity, strictly construe
statutes because they are in "deroga-
tion of sovereignty".
This exemption of the sovereign
fin control is exemplified by stat-
utes authorizing local units of gov-
erinent to adopt planning and zon-
ing ordinances. Almost without
exception, the legislature provides
that "the powers extended to agen-
cies, bureaus, departments, commis-
sions, divisions, or officials of the
state government by other state stat-
utes ...shall remain in full force
and effect. Powers of supervision and
regulation by such divisions of the
state government over city, town,
county, township and other local
governmental units, individuals,
firms or corporations also are not
abrogated and shall continue in full
effect."' Thus, the state remains out-
side local planning and land use
control. The state is free to locate a
new state highway garage in a single
family residence district and destroy
or materially damage the municipal-
ity's comprehensive plan.
No doubt it is also logical to ex-
empt state regulated public utilities.
But when they procure rights of
way, particularly for oil and natural
gas pipelines, without regard for the
local plan they frequently remove
hundreds of acres of land from local
development and often from any
practical use. Other utility exemp-
tions are even more difficult to jus-
tify. For example, in at least one
case, a local ordinance excluding
motels and trailer camps was de-
clared invalid because motels are
like "inns" which at common law
were utilities.
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Nor is the state the only offender.
The expansion of federal services
and activities has made the national
government one of the largest, if not
the largest, landowner today, and in
the hierarchy of sovereigns it con-
sistently asserts immunity from both
state and local action. a Even -where
it is not directly a landowner, but
regulates the activities of others, it
may claim immunity. Thus local
zoning which interferes with muni-
cipal air fields may be an invasion
of federal sovereignty.4 And where
it is a participant in an interstate
compact restricting land use it con-
1. Typical of such legislation is Indiana Acts
1947, c. 174, §93.
2. Motor Cargo, Inc. v. Board of Trustees,
117 N. E. 2d 224 (Court of Common Pleas,
Ohio, 1953).
3. Note, Eminent Domain: Intergovernment-
at Conlicts, 29 IND. L. J. 206 (1954).
4. Note, Federal Control of Land To Pro-
tect Airport Approaches, 48 N. W. L. REV. 343
(1953); Smylie, Constitutionality o Federal
Airport Zoning, 12 Geo. NVAsi. L. REv. 1
(1943).
5. " - - nothing contained in such compact
shall he construed as impairing or in any man-
sistently reserves its power not to be
bound by the compact.5
Adjacent municipalities by their
independent action, interfere with
or destroy the value of the master
plan of their neighbors. Thus where
two cities had common boundaries
and both boundaries were zoned res-
idential the New Jersey court found
a vested right in the residential oc-
cupants of one city to prevent the
change of land use in the other."
Other cases reflect the growing rec-
ognition by courts that in metropol-
itan areas the jurisdictional bound-
ary of one municipality does not
give it complete freedom to plan
and manage land use without rela-
tion to the total urbanized area.'
Inevitably, as Suburbia grows, the
jurisdictional conflict must be re-
solved on a metropolitan basis.8
Paradoxically, the most frequent
and probably the most serious vio-
lator of a city's comprehensive plan
is the city itself. Most zoning ordi-
nances declare that9
after the adoption of a comprehen-
sive plan by the comnission the coul-
ty and every city within the county
shall be guided and give due consid-
eration to the general policy and pat-
tern of development set out in the
master plan in the authorization, con-
struction, alteration, or abandonment
of public ways, public places, public
structures, or public utilities . ..
In spite of the common admonition
the board of works, the city council,
or the school board proceed with
their own short range and usually
short-sighted location of new struc-
tures. After expending substantial
sums for professional study of land
use, it is not uncommon for the city
fathers to violate the plan and lo-
cate the new fire station, the school,
the sewage disposal plant or the
park without regard to the compre-
hensive plan which had attempted
ner affecting any right or jurisdiction of the
United States in and over the region which
fcrms the subject of this compact." 54 Stat.
748 (1940). To the same effect, see: 52 Stat.
150 (1938); 50 Stat. 719 (1936); 49 Stat. 932
(1935).
6. Cresskill v. Dumont, 28 N. J. Super. 26,
100 A. 2d 182 (1953).
7. La Salle National Bank v. Chicago, 4 il1.
2d 253. 122 N. E. 2d 519 (1954).
8. See, for example, Metropolitan Area
Planning for Northeast Illinois and North-
western Indiana, Metropolitan Housing and
Planning Council, 1956.
9. Indiana Acts 1955, c. 283, §36.
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to insure sound traffic patterns, qui-
et and peaceful residential areas and
compatibility between commerce,
industry and living area.
In most cities the plan commis-
sion, although politically independ-
ent, is also politically impotent to
prevent the other agencies of local
government from violating the plan.
It is obvious that, even if fine and
imprisonment were sanctions against
municipal action, it would be politi-
cally unrealistic to expect them to
be applied to those who hold the
real power of local government.
Thus, if the city's plan is to be en-
forceable against it, some other
sanction is necessary. One experi-
ment in this direction was attempted
in the Indiana Metropolitan Plan
Act of 1955. 1 The act applies to
the City of tndianapolis, to Marion
County, and to all the smaller cit-
ies within the county, and as other
enabling acts it includes the usual
admonitory clause that the cities
and the county are to be guided and
give due consideration to the gen-
eral policy and pattern of develop-
ment set out in the comprehensive
plan.
In addition to this customary
statement, Section 36 further pro-
vides:"
Any action inconsistent with the
evidence set forth in the comprehen-
sive plan shall be presumed to be not
in the public interest.
This apparently innocuous phrase
may provide an effective sanction for
the enforcement of the plan against
the city and its officials. In effect,
this section means that if land is to
be taken by eminent domain for a
specific purpose inconsistent with
the comprehensive plan, proof of
this inconsistency will establish pre-
sumptively that the taking is not for
a public purpose. Likewise, if the
governmental unit seeks to issue
bonds for the erection of structures
at locations inconsistent with the
plan, no cautious bond house will
underwrite the bonds nor will its
attorneys approve the issue, for pre-
suiptively the public interest is not
served. The constitutionality of this
provision was attacked in Mogilner
v. Metropolitan Plan Conrnission. -
It was alleged that the provision vi-
olated Art. 1, §21 of the Indiana
Constitution providing that: "... no
man's property shall be taken by law
without just compensation . ..
The court rejected this allegation
summarily with the statement that
the section "does not relate to nor
provide for the taking nor condemn-
ing of property".
Secondly, it was alleged that "the
provision violated the due process
provisions of both the Indiana and
United States Constitution".
In response to this objection the
court said:li
It is, therefore, obvious that the "ac-
tion" referred to in the last paragraph
of Section 36 is action by city and
county units in authorizing and con-
structing public improvements ...
No constitutional requirement is vio-
lated by a statute which requires that
actions by governmental units must be
in the public interest, or as is usually
stated, for a public purpose....
Moreover, the last paragraph of Sec-
tion .6 merely creates a presumption
which would be dissolved on showing
the existence of public interest to the
contrary. The Act does not provide
that the presumption created is conclu-
sive. It is well established that statutes
which make evidentiary facts prima
facie of certain ultimate facts, other-
wise described as rebuttable presump-
tions created by statute, are valid . ..
With the constitutionality of this
provision apparently settled, it ap-
pears that further litigation on the
point is not likely to arise because
the provision is in a sense self-exe-
cuting, that is, with customary bank-
er's caution, a bonding house would
refuse to underwrite an issue rather
than gamble with a lawsuit. If this
prediction is correct, then local mu-
nicipal officials may be bound to re-
spect their own officially adopted
plans.
It is doubtful whether the expan-
sion of this section to include all
government agencies within the ter-
ritorial jurisdiction of the plan com-
mission can be effected. Once again
the issue of sovereignty arises. No
constitutional obstacle stands in the
way of a state legislature agreeing
that the agencies of the state will
abide by the comprehensive plan of
a local unit of government. Such
action, of course, would not bind
future legislatures, but until such a
statute was arended or repealed
there seems to be no reason why the
executive and administrative agen-
cies of government could not be re-
quired to comply with the local
plan. The big hurdle is that a legis-
lature is not likely to so restrain it-
self or its state departments or agen-
cies. As between the many agencies
of local government-city, town,
county, township, special districts,
school board, park and recreation
district, etc.-the legislature could
and probably would, place respon-
sibility for planning in a single unit
of government, the city, the county
or the metropolitan district.
Perhaps this sanction against in-
dependent local action provides one
of the less objectionable integrating
forces in a metropolitan area. With-
out the necessity of creating a "su-
per-government", integration of the
planning activities of scores and of-
ten hundreds of independent gov-
ernmental units within a metropoli-
tan area might be effected t5
10. Ibid.
it. Id.
12. Ind. , 140 N. E. 2d 220 (1957)
13. Supra note 12, page 225.
14- Supra note 8.
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